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Introduction
Across healthcare, organizations are increasingly 
focused on improving patient safety. Yet in the 
prehospital setting, there is a paucity of informa-
tion about the safety of care, in spite of the well-
known and documented idiosyncrasies.1–6 One 
component of prehospital care that is particularly 
understudied, yet highly influential to patient 
safety is medication administration.2,3,5,6,7,8 This 
paper will discuss the issue of medication errors 
in emergency medical services (EMSs), describe a 
novel method developed to reduce their fre-
quency, and analyze its effectiveness.
Like many other healthcare providers, paramedics 
are taught to verify medications prior to adminis-
tration using the ‘five rights’.9,10 The five rights of 
medication administration require a provider to 
mentally confirm that their actions are performed 
on the right patient, using the right drug, with the 
right dose, via the right route, and at the right time. 
Emphasized in textbooks, the five rights are com-
monly taught and practiced as a one-person set of 
mental considerations.10,11–15 Yet, like many 
practices in EMSs, the efficacy of the five rights in 
preventing errors has never been evaluated or 
quantified in any setting.16 Several authors have 
questioned the ecological validity of the five rights 
as a medication verification process citing that they 
more accurately represent goals of safe medication 
administration and do not reflect the mental work, 
complexity, and context of performing the actual 
task.17–22 Interestingly, recommendations are com-
monly made for additional ‘rights’ to supplement 
the original five in an apparent attempt to improve 
error sensitivity and refine the process’ ergonomic 
application,20,22,23–25 but empirical support is lack-
ing. In spite of these issues, a commonly cited ‘root 
cause’ of medication error is lack of verification, 
implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) assuming 
that proper execution of the verification process 
would have prevented them; relegating causal 
explanation of error to human failure.26 Although 
recommendations for validated features of verifica-
tion processes have been in existence for some 
time,27,28 contemporary approaches to error reduc-
tion continue to focus on individual aptitude.29 
These improvement efforts (which often take the 
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form of remedial education or admonishing indi-
viduals to ‘be more careful’) often fail in part 
because they do not address sources of error 
embedded in processes amenable to sustained 
improvement3,30–32 and do not account for the 
sociotechnical nature of situated work, both cogni-
tive and physical.33
Using a systems approach informed by human 
factors science and extant archival data, provid-
ers and managers at Sedgwick County Emergency 
Medical Service (SCEMS) developed and imple-
mented a team-based communication protocol 
known as the medication administration cross-
check (MACC) which serves as a standardized 
method of medication verification to reduce 
errors. It was hypothesized that by inserting 
another provider into the process of medication 
verification and designing error specific traps, 
the practice would capitalize on the core compo-
nents (e.g. mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behavior) and coordinating mechanisms 
(i.e. closed-loop communication) of teamwork 
to create a process that is robust to the errors of 
a single provider.34
Methods
Sedgwick County EMS is a medium-sized 
municipal ambulance agency serving a popula-
tion of nearly 500,000 within a 1008 square mile 
jurisdiction in the state of Kansas, USA. Because 
this investigation analyzed archival data col-
lected by SCEMS to determine the effectiveness 
of a quality improvement intervention, a certifi-
cate of exemption was granted by the institu-
tional review board.
Self-reporting of medication errors is a compul-
sory practice at SCEMS and was performed by 
electronic means using a centralized system, gen-
erally done when crews are at the station after an 
error has been identified. Reports are not 
anonymized and include a narrative description of 
the error in question as well as a patient care report 
number for reference. Beyond simply tabulating 
frequencies, SCEMS routinely categorizes medi-
cation errors according to the following four tax-
onomies: (1) errors by medication, (2) errors by 
type, (3) Reason’s generic error-modelling system 
(GEMS), and (4) the National Coordinating 
Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention (NCC MERP) index.35 There are lim-
itations with each and there is no universally 
accepted standard for the prehospital setting (for a 
review, see Hughes and colleagues),36 which is 
why SCEMS leverages all four to inform strategic 
improvement initiatives. Since each taxonomy 
offers unique information about a single error, all 
were considered important to the design and the 
evaluation of the MACC’s effectiveness and errors 
that might persist after implementation could 
inform future process refinements. As such, our 
analysis compared pre/post-intervention error 
rates within each taxonomy as they are operation-
alized by SCEMS:
1. ‘Errors by medication’ refers to the tabula-
tion of errors according to the correspond-
ing medication that was administered. In 
the event of a wrong drug error, SCEMS 
tabulates the error according to that which 
the provider intended to give, not the medi-
cation that was inadvertently administered.
2. ‘Error type’ consists of distinctions shown 
in Table 1. While some of these distinctions 
are common descriptions of active errors, 
they are by no means universal nor are they 
necessarily mutually exclusive. However, 
for this study no errors were tabulated as 
more than one type.
3. The GEMS taxonomy is a performance-
based categorization of behavior as either 
skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based. 
This was first described by Rasmussen and 
later refined by Reason.31,33,37,38 Skill-based 
errors are designated as errors of action, 
such as a slip or lapse, in which the action 
executed (or failed to be executed in the case 
of a lapse) was not that which was intended. 
Rule and knowledge-based errors are con-
sidered errors of intent, essentially the exe-
cution of a bad plan.29,39 However, the 
distinction was made between knowledge-
based and rule-based on the grounds that a 
provider who executed an appropriate treat-
ment in the wrong way committed a rule-
based error. An example of a rule-based 
error would be the administration of an 
appropriate medication without proper 
authorization either by medical protocol or 
online medical direction (i.e. direct verbal 
contact with a physician). A medication 
error was tabulated as a knowledge-based 
error when a medication administration was 
inappropriate, not indicated, or contraindi-
cated. A dose error could be either skill, rule, 
or knowledge-based, and was determined by 
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the information provided within the error 
report submitted by the provider.
4. The NCC MERP index was applied to eval-
uate errors according to the algorithmically 
prescribed groups, which is essentially a 
severity-of-outcome index.35 NCC MERP 
taxonomy definitions are presented in Table 
2. It should be noted however, that this 
index was not intended for the prehospital 
setting; nonetheless, there are no alterna-
tives and the managers of SCEMS find the 
information useful for tabulating the out-
comes of errors committed.
Intervention
During the first months of 2012, SCEMS under-
took the development of an intervention to reduce 
the frequency of medication errors committed by its 
paramedics. The MACC procedure was designed 
to meet the goals of safe medication administration 
and was refined through an iterative process of field 
evaluation (pilot testing) and feedback to assure 
practicality and usability. Because the nature of the 
intervention is novel to the prehospital setting and 
the information used for its development may be 
informative to other agencies seeking to address the 
issue of medication errors, a brief description of its 
development is provided in Appendix A. Figure 1 
depicts the final implemented version of the MACC 
evaluated during the study period.
Over the course of a month (March 2012), all full-
time field providers [n = 140; paramedics = 97%, 
emergency medical technicians (EMTs) = 3%] 
received an online introduction of the intent and 
rationale of the standardized procedure as well as 
didactic education explaining its execution, fol-
lowed by lab practice, drawing medications, verify-
ing, and plunging medications into a receptacle. 
Timed trials of the procedure in a lab setting aver-
aged 24 s for completion of the verification process. 
The MACC was then implemented and codified 
into the medical protocols as the official procedure 
for verification, to be executed by all providers. 
Half-page sized MACC procedure cards were lam-
inated and placed in the ambulance and medica-
tion box, and small, plastic identification badge size 
copies were given to all providers in the agency.
Modifications to the patient care reporting system 
were also made such that any entry of a medica-
tion in the flowchart would prompt the two ques-
tions depicted in Figure 2.
Table 1. Medication error types and examples.
Error type Example
Incorrect dose (regardless of 
appropriateness)
Intended 50 mg, administered 75 mg
Inappropriate situation for 
administration/ not indicated
Administration of an antiarrhythmic to a patient in cardiac 
arrest with pulseless electrical activity
No order/ not authorized (regardless of 
appropriateness)
Appropriate administration of drug, without protocol or online 
authorization
Wrong drug Intended one drug, administered another
Dilution/ preparation error (correct 
dosage)
Administered a drug at full concentration when it requires 
dilution for clinical reasons
Omission of an appropriate drug Protocol prescribes a medication that was not given
Inappropriate route (correct dose) Medication given by a route that is not authorized, for 
example, intramuscular versus intravenous
Contraindicated Medication is explicitly prohibited given clinical presentation, 
for example, known allergy
Expired medication Medication is beyond the labelled expiration date
Incorrect time Medications that require specific timing which lend to errors, 
for example, repeat doses given too soon after initial dose
Therapeutic Advances in Drug Safety 00(0)
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After notification of a near-miss (an email generated 
automatically by the patient care reporting system), 
an investigation was conducted. Near-miss infor-
mation was collected and evaluated by the same 
taxonomies used for medication errors to provide 
insight into the types and nature of errors prevented 
by the process, and to inform process modification 
or training at the system level. However, since near-
miss data was only collected after implementation, 
it is not submitted here for analysis.
Statistical analysis
The absolute and relative frequency of medication 
errors (i.e. errors per opportunity) were tabulated 
for the entire 54 months study period so as to pro-
vide an overall picture of the medication error data, 
and then were analyzed separately for the 27 months 
pre/post-MACC periods (Tables 3 and 4). A time-
frame of 27 months post-implementation was cho-
sen as the endpoint of the evaluation period a priori 
since this would allow for equal periods of sound, 
consistent, and reliable medication error data 
before and after implementation. Two-tailed inde-
pendent samples Student’s t tests were used to 
evaluate statistical significance. The change in error 
rates within each taxonomy were evaluated in the 
same manner. Additionally, the error rate for fenta-
nyl was of particular interest because errors involv-
ing this medication were identified a priori as 
occurring with higher frequency; and because at 
the time the intervention was developed, fentanyl 
was the most commonly administered parenteral 
medication, it presented the greatest opportunity to 
demonstrate improvement.
Results
Sedgwick County EMS responded to 250,416 
requests for service during the 54 months study 
period, an average of 4637 per month [standard 
deviation (SD) = 295]; transporting 169,334 
Table 2. National coordinating council for medication error reporting and prevention index category definitions.35
Category Definition
Errors that do not ‘reach’ the patient/ incomplete errors
 No error
 Category A Circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error (i.e. a safety concern).
 Error, no harm
 Category B An error occurred but the error did not reach the patient, an ‘error of omission’ does 
reach the patient (i.e. a near-miss).
Errors that ‘reach’ the patient/ Completed errors
 Error, no harm
 Category C An error occurred that reached the patient, but did not cause patient harm.
 Category D An error occurred that reached the patient and required monitoring to confirm that it 
resulted in no harm to the patient and/or required intervention to preclude harm.
 Error, harm
 Category E An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the 
patient and required intervention.
 Category F An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the 
patient and required initial or prolonged hospitalization.
 Category G An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in permanent patient harm.
 Category H An error that occurred that required intervention to sustain life.
 Error, death
 Category I An error that occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in the patient’s death.
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patients for an average of 3136 per month (SD = 
188). It should be noted however, that the general 
trend of call volume for the study period was 
slightly increasing; the average monthly call vol-
ume during the post-MACC period was 7.2% 
higher than the pre-MACC period. Further, the 
linear trend of the number of medication doses 
administered also increased throughout the study 
period. Providers administered a total of 73,522 
medication doses, 42% of which were parenteral 
medications. Medications (both enteral and paren-
teral) were given on an average of 29.4% of total 
calls (SD = 2.8%) or 43.4% of transported patients 
(SD = 3.6%). Parenteral medications were given 
on an average of 12.4% of total calls (SD = 1.6%) 
or 18.2% of transported patients (SD = 2.2%).
Pre/Post-MACC results
Error frequencies and medication dose counts 
(i.e. opportunities for error) for the course of the 
study period are juxtaposed in Figure 3 and aver-
age monthly error rates (errors per opportunity 
per month) before and after MACC implementa-
tion and are depicted in Figure 4.
A total of 58 errors were recorded pre-MACC for 
an average monthly error rate of 0.17% (SD = 
0.17%) and 33 errors were recorded post-MACC 
for an average monthly error rate of 0.09% (SD = 
0.07%), a decrease of 49.0%, p = .01. The over-
all reduction of error frequency was realized in 
spite of a 12.9% increase in the number of medi-
cation doses during the post-MACC period.
Errors by medication. Results showed a 71.1% 
decrease in the average monthly fentanyl error rate 
(pre-MACC: mean = 0.63%, SD = 0.75%; post-
MACC: mean = 0.18%, SD = 0.35%; p = .004) 
contrasted against a 35.1% increase in the number 
of fentanyl doses administered in the post-MACC 
period. If the number of fentanyl doses and errors 
Figure 1. The medication administration cross-
check© procedure. From The Medication Administration 
Cross-Check by P. Misasi, 2013, Wichita-Sedgwick 
County EMS System.40 Copyright 2013 by Paul Misasi. 
Reprinted with permission.
Figure 2. Pop-up dialog box following the entry of a medication in the patient care report. Information of a 
near-miss is automatically forwarded to management.
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Table 3. Overall and pre/post-medication administration cross-check error analysis.
Overall Pre-MACC Post-MACC % change p
Month count 54 27 27  
Responses 250,416 120,503 129,913 7.8%  
Transports 169,334 81,599 87,735 7.5%  
Medication doses 73,522 34,531 38,991 12.9%  
 Average monthly doses 1361.5 1278.93 1444.11 12.9%  
 Enteral medication doses 42,609 20,449 22,160 8.4%  
 Average monthly doses 789.1 757.4 820.7 8.4%  
 Parenteral medication doses 30,913 14,082 16,831 19.5%  
 Average monthly doses 572.5 521.6 623.4 19.5%  
Fentanyl doses 7421 2922 4499 54.0%  
 Avg. monthly fentanyl doses 137.4 108.2 166.6 54.0%  
Medication error count† 91 58 33 −43.1%  
Average number of errors (per month) 1.7 2.2 1.2 −45.5%  
Average monthly error rate (all 
medications)
0.128% 0.169% 0.086% −49.0% .013
Average monthly error rate (fentanyl only) 0.407% 0.632% 0.182% −71.1% .004
Average monthly error rate (all meds 
excluding fentanyl)
0.100% 0.127% 0.073% −42.1% .065
Medication error type rates  
Error count† 83 50 33 −34.0%  
 Incorrect dose administered 54.2% 44.0% 69.7% 26.0%  
 Average monthly errors .83 .81 .85 −4.5% .552
  Inappropriate situation for 
administration/not indicated
18.1% 28.0% 3.0% −25.0%  
 Average monthly errors .28 .52 .04 −92.9% .026
 No order (unauthorized) 8.4% 10.0% 6.1% −3.9%  
 Average monthly errors .13 .19 .07 −60.0% .119
 Wrong drug 7.2% 8.0% 6.1% −1.9%  
 Average monthly errors .11 .15 .07 −50.0% .200
 Dilution/ preparation error (correct dose) 6.0% 6.0% 6.1% 0.1%  
 Omission of appropriate drug 3.61% 4.0% 3.0% −1.0%  
 Inappropriate route 1.2% 0.0% 3.0% 3.0%  
 Contraindicated 1.2% 0.0% 3.0% 3.0%  
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are removed from the monthly totals and the pre/
post-MACC monthly error rate change is analyzed 
in the same manner, the reduction is still substan-
tial (42.1%) but not significant (p = .065).
Errors by type. Analysis was conducted to assess 
any change between the top four pre-MACC 
error types: (1) incorrect dose, (2) inappropriate 
situation for administration/ not indicated, (3) no 
order/ unauthorized, and (4) wrong drug. Only 
errors designated as ‘inappropriate situation for 
administration/ not indicated’, approached 
significance at the p < .025 level with a decrease 
of 92.9% (pre-MACC: M = .52, SD = 1.22; 
post-MACC: M = .04, SD = .19; p = .027).
Errors by GEMS. In the same manner, analyses 
were conducted on changes in the average 
monthly errors based on the GEMS taxonomy. 
Of the three categories, only knowledge-based 
errors approached a statistically significant 
decrease of 82.4% at the p < .025 level (pre-
MACC: M = .63, SD = 1.33; post-MACC: M = 
.11, SD = .32), p = .03.
Overall Pre-MACC Post-MACC % change p
 Expired medication 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
 Incorrect time of administration 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Error count† 83 50 33 −34.0%  
 Skill-based error 31.3% 24.0% 42.4% 18.4%  
 Average monthly errors .48 .44 .52 16.7% .635
 Rule-based error 44.6% 42.0% 48.5% 6.5%  
 Average monthly errors .69 .78 .59 23.8% .193
 Knowledge-based error 24.1% 34.0% 9.1% −24.9%  
 Average monthly errors .37 .63 .11 −82.4% .030
NCC MERP index rates††  
Error count† 83 50 33  
 Category C 88.0% 92.0% 81.8% −10.2%  
 Average monthly errors 1.38 1.70 1.04 −39.0 .055
 Category D 10.8% 8.0% 15.2% 7.2%  
 Average monthly errors .17 .15 .19 25.0% .639
 Category E 1.2% 0.0% 3.0% 3.0%  
 Category F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
 Category G 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
 Category H 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
 Category I 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Error rate = frequency/ # months; average monthly error rate = (# errors/ # opportunities to error)/ # months.
†Not all medication errors were able to be appropriately typed due to varying amounts of error information collected in the 
first 27 months.
††Information for Category A (safety concerns) and Category B (near-misses) were excluded due to lack of sufficient data.
MACC, medication administration cross-check; NCC MERP, National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting 
and Prevention.
Table 3. (Continued)
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Errors by NCC MERP. Lastly, the average monthly 
error rate change for errors categorized using the 
NCC MERP index was assessed, however none 
of the changes reached the level of statistical 
significance.
Discussion
In spite of the difficult and debatable nature of 
quantifying errors, let alone assessing the effect of 
an intervention on those errors, the MACC shows 
potential as an important component in the effort 
to reduce medication errors committed in the 
prehospital setting. Notwithstanding limitations 
described below, this study is the first of its kind. 
Additionally, the implications of these findings 
may well extend to other areas of healthcare 
whose providers utilize unproven methods for 
verifying medication accuracy or work in less con-
trolled and less technologically sophisticated set-
tings. A 49% monthly error rate decrease over a 
substantial time period was demonstrated, with 
particular success (71% monthly error rate reduc-
tion) in the administration of a commonly used 
analgesic in the prehospital setting. Thus, the 
MACC appears to be successful in achieving the 
purpose of medication error reduction.
Conventional methods of verification as com-
monly taught and practiced rely on the mind that 
Table 4. Medication errors by medication (entire study period, 54 months). Medications without errors are not 
listed.
Medication Error count Doses Overall relative 
error frequency
Adenosine 1 396 0.25%
Albuterol 1 7840 0.01%
Amiodarone 1 253 0.40%
Aspirin 1 8619 0.01%
Atropine 12 2110 0.57%
Calcium chloride 2 78 2.56%
Dextrose 1 3714 0.03%
Epinephrine 1:1,000 2 179 1.12%
Epinephrine 1:10,000 2 7031 0.03%
Fentanyl 27 7421 0.36%
Ketorolac 2 63 3.17%
Labetalol 0 34 0.00%
Lidocaine 11 396 2.78%
Lidocaine drip 1G / 250D5W 1 131 0.76%
Lorazepam 11 796 1.38%
Magnesium sulfate 3 109 2.75%
Midazolam 9 685 1.31%
Narcan 2 810 0.25%
NTG 1 18,559 0.01%
Prednisone 1 287 0.35%
NTG = nitroglycerin.
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produced an error to also prevent it, which is a 
brittle strategy to assure patient safety.10 Whereas 
the MACC was designed with the presumption of 
human fallibility, not the expectation of perfec-
tion. There is simply too much variability with 
mental verification processes to solely rely on the 
mental processes of a single provider for safe 
medication administration. The nature of achiev-
ing expertise in any field results in the reduced 
amount of consciously directed cognitive effort 
devoted to a task41,42; in other words, less ‘think-
ing’ is involved. Thus, admonishing providers to 
think really hard, be really careful, or double or 
triple-check, especially when they have performed 
the task hundreds, if not thousands of times, is 
diametrical to the nature of the cognitive task.29 
Morrow, North and Wickens43 described that 
preventing the majority of medication errors does 
not require a re-doubled effort of concentration, 
but a carefully designed and guided interruption 
of automatized behavior.44 Although there are 
multiple scientifically sound recommendations in 
the literature that argue for reducing the load on 
working memory,28,43,45 the prehospital setting 
has yet to strategically and systematically adopt 
many of these practices, despite the vulnerabili-
ties imposed by stressful situations, time com-
pression, and the unique context in which care is 
delivered.36,46 Thus, the MACC likely achieves 
error sensitivity by requiring communication 
Figure 3. Frequency of medication errors (measured on the primary axis) per month during the study period 
compared against the opportunities to error (doses administered); measured on the secondary axis.
Figure 4. Reduction in average monthly error rates.
*Indicates p < .025.
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between providers. Not only does the cross-check 
serve to interrupt the automaticity of the process 
of giving a medication, it also slows the process 
enough for attention to focus on behavior because 
cross-checking is cognitively effortful, requiring a 
reconceptualization of the task.47
Another reason the MACC may have demon-
strated a significant reduction in medication 
errors could also be due to the insertion of 
another provider as an additional barrier of 
defense, a ‘defenses-in-depth’ strategy,31 which 
adds redundancy and resilience into the process. 
In other words, part of the system can fail, but 
does not result in total system failure. The reduc-
tion of knowledge-based errors (82.4%) lends 
itself as a demonstration of this effect; by bring-
ing the knowledge of the additional provider to 
bear, errors were likely corrected and averted, a 
phenomenon described in the teamwork litera-
ture.34 Given the design of the MACC, in order 
for a medication error to reach the patient it must 
penetrate the knowledge and abilities of two 
providers.
Although not all errors were prevented after 
implementation of the cross-check, analysis of 
these errors has proven quite informative. 
Investigations identified that in these cases, the 
MACC was not used as designed or at all, which 
was expected. Paramedicine has traditionally 
been practiced individualistically rather than 
team-based, so adapting to a team-based medica-
tion verification process may require a shift in 
providers’ mindset. More importantly, when 
errors occurred despite the MACC, they were 
identified as knowledge-based or rule-based 
errors committed by two providers simultane-
ously, which suggests system-level education or 
training may be necessary (as opposed to individ-
ual remediation) or the redesign of decision sup-
port systems such as protocols or the introduction 
of cognitive aids such as dosing references may be 
warranted.
The MACC also leverages the short and long-term 
benefits of collaborative cross-checking, team-
work, and communication, which have been real-
ized in other domains such as aviation. Teamwork 
has been shown to improve performance by as 
much as 20%48 and Patterson and colleagues47 and 
Freund and colleagues49 detail many of the bene-
fits of cross-checking. This could be of great ben-
efit at a low cost; the MACC can be learned and 
utilized relatively quickly, and for the cost of 
printing off a card for each provider within the 
organization. Given the data presented, we believe 
that this could be a very beneficial intervention in 
regard to patient safety. The MACC was devel-
oped with good team practice and communication 
skills in mind and should enhance teamwork 
between providers while handling the complexity 
of administering medications.
Limitations
There are some limitations to bear in mind in 
review of these results. First, the study lacks a 
nonequivalent control group to compare respec-
tive amounts of change in prevailing and resultant 
error rates over time. Therefore, to improve the 
generalizability of the results and lend convergent 
validity, a multi-site or multi-group quasi-experi-
mental design comparing the MACC with other 
methods of medication verification are recom-
mended.50,51 Other variables such as the manage-
rial efforts to develop a culture of safety as well as 
incorporate so called ‘just culture’ philosophies 
(whereby human error is explicitly managed in a 
nonpunitive fashion) may also have played a role 
across the latter half of the study period; although 
it could be argued that this would have increased 
the number of errors reported, in spite of which 
our results demonstrate a reduction. Inherent dif-
ficulties in assessing the true number of medica-
tion errors are well known,2,3,5,6,25 especially since 
most errors are self-reported and direct field 
observation is not practical.6 The most common 
errors (by medication) identified in this study 
were controlled substances, which require strict 
control and reconciliation processes not common 
to all medications administered; so it should not 
necessarily be inferred that administration of nar-
cotics are particularly troublesome or error prone. 
Also, just like any cognitive aid, compliance and 
complacency can become a problem as individu-
als become used to using the tool over time. 
Lastly, the formulary of medications was not con-
sistent across the entire study, some were added, 
and some were removed at various times. For 
example, midazolam was inserted into the formu-
lary during the 32nd month; the last dose of 
lorazepam was administered during the 33rd 
month. It should be noted however that fentanyl 
was a part of the formulary for the entire 54-month 
duration of the study.
Other potential threats to internal validity such as 
history, maturation, statistical regression to the 
mean, and the Hawthorne effect should be 
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considered. History threats could have been other 
incidents or interventions taking place through-
out the MACC training period that led to the 
change in the outcome, although this seems 
unlikely because no other interventions at the 
time were focused on medication errors. 
Maturation effects could be due to overall safety 
culture growth in the organization. Regression to 
the mean could have led to the decrease in medi-
cation errors across time, but the significant drop 
in errors after the intervention provides evidence 
against this. Finally, the nature of the study was 
salient to the participants, which could affect their 
performance through the Hawthorne effect, 
although the long time span of this study makes 
Hawthorne effects unlikely.
In addition to addressing the issues enumerated 
above with additional research, some interesting 
and organic developments to the process should 
be evaluated. Since the end of the study period, 
SCEMS field providers developed a pocket-sized 
‘contraindications card’ as a cognitive aide and to 
improve EMT’s engagement in the verification 
process. Another avenue of research that should 
be explored is the addition of dosing references 
(e.g. paper or electronic).
Also, an assessment of ‘near-misses’ was not con-
ducted until after MACC implementation and 
are therefore not reported here. Thus, an addi-
tional site investigation into the effectiveness of 
the MACC would do well to include this variable 
into the analysis before implementation.
Lastly, to date there is no universally accepted defi-
nition of a medication error in the prehospital set-
ting nor a taxonomy for their classification, and 
those that do exist are an extension from the hospi-
tal setting and have limitations in terms of applica-
bility. For example, this study considered a dose 
error to be any dose other than that which was pre-
scribed (i.e. exact measurement), while other stud-
ies offer as much as a 20% margin.52 Furthermore, 
the taxonomies utilized in this study describe active 
errors and provide insight into the technical nature 
of the error, but do not consider the antecedents or 
latent factors that may contribute to error produc-
tion.31,36 Hughes and colleagues have proposed a 
taxonomy adapting the human factors analysis and 
classification system (HFACS) following a system-
atic review of medication error in EMS literature.36 
The usefulness of this taxonomy has yet to be dem-
onstrated with field data but is worth exploring 
since this would likely assist in the targeting of 
intervention efforts that do not simply focus on 
individual competence.
Conclusion
The MACC was designed to capitalize on the 
benefits of teamwork and collaborative cross-
checking. Notwithstanding the limitations of this 
study, it is the first step toward an empirically 
validated method of medication verification to 
reduce errors.
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Appendix A
Development of the MACC
Overall, four sources of information were used to 
support development and design elements of the 
MACC: (1) archival agency data on medication 
error frequency and analysis, (2) observational data 
recorded from a credentialing evaluation process 
(i.e. simulated patient scenarios) of paramedics, (3) 
data from an internal agency survey that assessed 
prevailing methods of verification, and (4) tenets 
and practices established in human factors science, 
such as teamwork (particularly closed-loop com-
munication), collaborative cross-checking, and the 
use of cognitive artifacts; additional information 
regarding the last three is provided below.
A.1. Observations from the credentialing pro-
cess. In 2011, the Wichita-Sedgwick County 
EMS System’s Office of the Medical Director 
instituted a provider credentialing process to 
assure continued competency. In addition to a 
written exam, case review, and interview with the 
medical director, providers were required to com-
plete one randomly selected, medical call simula-
tion in the lab and one cardiac arrest simulation 
(both video recorded for post hoc analysis). Of 
those evaluated, 31% committed a medication 
error that they were not aware of during the car-
diac arrest simulation; most which were identified 
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as dosing/skill-based errors whereby the provider 
intended to administer the correct dose (i.e. ver-
balized the correct dose) but delivered an incor-
rect dose. The information gleaned from this 
process suggested that a verification process that 
relies on one person may be a brittle strategy.
A.2. Agency medication administration methods 
survey. Information about the prevailing meth-
ods of medication verification and self-reported 
errors were collected by way of internal agency 
survey. A total of 107 of the 140 full-time field 
paramedics completed the survey in early 2012 
for a response rate of 71.3%. One-hundred per-
cent of respondents indicated that they perform a 
verification process prior to medication adminis-
tration; 77% of whom stated they use the five 
rights method and the remaining indicated they 
verify by other means. Of these providers, 60% 
stated that they had committed a medication 
error in their career. This information reinforced 
the conclusions made by Grissinger9 and others 
that healthcare providers believe that they do ver-
ify appropriately using the five rights and yet still 
commit medication errors. Combined with the 
findings from error data and credentialing obser-
vation, the question of how to prevent someone 
from making a medication error, changed to one 
of whether it was possible for someone to prevent 
themselves from doing something they believed to 
be correct, as the common practice of the five 
rights would suggest.
A.3. MACC design considerations derived from 
human factors. The MACC was designed to 
‘catch’ errors in production, including errors of 
dose, route, rate, contraindications, preparation 
(i.e. dilution/ concentration) and wrong drug 
administration. It was developed assuming pro-
viders are vulnerable to errors of action, i.e. a slip 
or lapse, and assumed local rationality.53 Given 
the prevalence of errors identified as dosing slips 
unbeknownst to those who committed them, and 
despite their belief of positive, correct verification, 
the MACC designers concluded that any effort to 
prevent errors would require another provider. 
Freund and colleagues27 identified that one of 
only two key factors associated with reduced 
adverse events in the emergency department 
was the involvement of an additional physician.27 
In the prehospital setting, this is feasible because 
care is typically delivered in teams of dyads.6
Steps to assure closed-loop communication and 
visual verification were also designed into the pro-
cess. Further, the MACC requires the provider 
administering the medication to verbalize why a 
drug is being given, thereby explicitly communicat-
ing intent and rationale, which serves to make the 
provider’s mental model explicit (i.e. the patient’s 
condition and need for a particular therapy). This 
was thought to improve the quality of the team’s 
shared mental model that has been shown to result 
in higher quality decision making in teams.34 The 
cross-check sequence requires concurrence from a 
verifier to proceed. In the event that disagreement 
occurs, or a reason that should preclude adminis-
tration becomes known, the process must either be 
discontinued or corrections made; thereafter the 
process is repeated from the beginning.
Ultimately, the MACC creates a situation where 
the verifier must authorize the administration of a 
medication; and although designers anticipated 
the cross-check would not prevent all medication 
errors, the arrangement of a second provider’s 
concurrence creates two conditions worthy of 
consideration: (1) a situation whereby errors are 
informative beyond the deficiencies of a single 
provider (suggesting that a higher system-level 
issue may need addressed), and (2) team-level 
accountability for the safe and correct administra-
tion of medications to patients.
Lastly, designers understood that the process would 
be utilized by and with team members of lower-
level certification than paramedics, for example, 
basic-level EMTs. The designers theorized that 
although this situation may jeopardize the sensitiv-
ity of the process, many of the engineered benefits 
of the process would be retained: (1) an EMT can 
still visually inspect that the drug prepared is the 
drug intended, (2) an EMT can confirm that the 
volume or quantity prepared corresponds with 
what was articulated, (3) the brief time it takes to 
execute the process serves as a ‘pause point,’ and 
(4) by requiring a provider to vocalize their intent, 
they are more likely to prevent their own errors, 
even when alone (e.g. during transport), similar to 
that of a proofreading process.
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